Broadening the Scope of Electronic Reproductions: The Interpretation of Section 201(c)  in \u3ci\u3eFaulkner v. National Geographic Enterprises Inc.\u3c/i\u3e by Sivalingam, Shan
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 1
8-24-2006
Broadening the Scope of Electronic
Reproductions: The Interpretation of Section
201(c) in Faulkner v. National Geographic Enterprises
Inc.
Shan Sivalingam
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Journal of Law,
Technology & Arts by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shan Sivalingam, Broadening the Scope of Electronic Reproductions: The Interpretation of Section 201(c) in Faulkner v. National Geographic
Enterprises Inc., 3 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 1 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol3/iss1/1
Broadening the Scope of Electronic Reproductions >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a001Sivalingam.html[3/23/2010 9:00:31 AM]
ISSUES
Current Issue
Back Issues
TOPICS
Corporate & Commercial
Intellectual Property
Constitutional &
Regulatory
Litigation
SEARCH 
 
Shidler Center
UW School of Law
HOME SUBSCRIBE SUBMISSIONS MEMBERSHIP EDITORIAL BOARD ABOUT CONTACT US
Intellectual Property 
Cite as: Shan Sivalingam, Broadening the Scope of Electronic
Reproductions: The Interpretation of Section 201(c) in Faulkner v.
National Geographic Enterprises Inc., 3 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 1
(Aug. 24, 2006), at
<http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a001Sivalingam.html>
BROADENING THE SCOPE OF ELECTRONIC
REPRODUCTIONS: THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
201(C) IN FAULKNER V. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC
ENTERPRISES INC.
By Shan Sivalingam1
© 2006 Shan Sivalingam
Abstract
This Article analyzes the implications of the recent decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Faulkner v. National Geographic Enterprises Inc. The court
interpreted § 201(c) of the federal Copyright Act to permit
National Geographic to compile print issues of its magazine
into a CD-ROM digital archive without explicit permission
from freelance authors who contributed to the print issues.
The court’s decision has raised concern among freelance
journalists and photographers who contribute works to
newspapers and other periodicals that compile copyrighted
works. This Article outlines significant features of the
Faulkner decision and analyzes it within a larger framework
of cases that have dealt with electronic reproductions of
collective works. The Article concludes that while the
Faulkner decision is in accord with the interpretation of §
201(c) that the United States Supreme Court set forth in
New York Times Co. v. Tasini, the decision weakens the
control of freelance contributors over their copyrighted
works.
Table of Contents
Introduction
The Copyright Act and Collective Works
The Faulkner Opinion
The Effect of Faulkner
Is Faulkner consistent with earlier cases?
1
Sivalingam: Broadening the Scope of Electronic Reproductions: The Interpretat
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2006
Broadening the Scope of Electronic Reproductions >> Shidler Journal of Law, Commerce & Technology
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol3/a001Sivalingam.html[3/23/2010 9:00:31 AM]
Electronic Reproduction Spectrum
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
<1> In Faulkner v. National Geographic Enterprises Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted
to balance the intellectual property rights of two competing
groups: publishers and freelance periodical contributors.2  The
issue before the court was whether a publisher’s electronic
compilation3  of its magazine issues into a CD-ROM archive was
an authorized revision of the original magazine issues under §
201(c) of the Copyright Act.4  The court held that National
Geographic’s digital archive of its print publications was a
privileged revision of its previously copyrighted compilations and
therefore did not constitute infringement.5
<2> The Faulkner case represents a significant development in
copyright law. Under Faulkner, publishers are allowed to compile
information in digital media—a media that did not exist when
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976.6  The Faulkner
court’s recognition of electronic reproductions under § 201(c)
expanded the rights of publishers to compile information and
limited the rights of periodical contributors to have greater
control over the use of their works. This holding represents the
first direct application of the “original context” rule for electronic
reproductions under § 201(c) that the United States Supreme
Court established in New York Times Co. v. Tasini.7  This
application of the § 201(c) rule raises serious questions about
the ability of freelance authors to protect their works from
reproductions not contemplated by their original copyright
licenses.
THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND COLLECTIVE WORKS
<3> It is useful to examine the law that governs the transfer of
copyright ownership from the original author to the author of a
compilation in order to better understand the genesis of the
issue in Faulkner. The Copyright Act (the “Act”) generally
protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”8  The Act defines a “compilation” as an
original work formed by selecting, coordinating, and arranging
preexisting materials.9  A compilation also includes collective
works, “such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a
collective whole.”10
2
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<4> Traditionally, original authors had little control over
publication of their works after allowing them to be included in a
collective work. Before 1976, federal copyright law recognized a
freelance author’s copyright in a published work only when the
author’s work appeared with a copyright notice printed next to
the author’s name. An author risked losing all future rights in
his article if he contributed an article to a collective work
without affixing a copyright notice.11
<5> In 1976, Congress completed a major revision of the Act.
One result of this revision was to guarantee the rights of
contributors to collective works. Specifically, the Act
distinguishes “copyright in each separate contribution to a
collective work” from “copyright in the collective work as a
whole.” 12  The former “vests initially in the author of the
contribution,” whereas “the owner of copyright in the collective
work is presumed to have acquired only the privilege of
reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective work,
and any later collective work in the same series.”13  This rule
grants the owner of a collective work a privilege to revise the
collective work.14
<6> Congress stated that these revisions were intended to
preserve the original author’s copyright in a contribution
“without requiring any unqualified transfer of rights to the owner
of the collective work.”15  But in 1976, Congress had not
anticipated the advent of new digital technologies that have
dramatically enhanced the ability to store, distribute, and
display information. Consequently, the revised Act is ambiguous
as to whether an electronic compilation of print publication
issues falls within § 201(c)’s protection for “revision[s]” of a
collective work.16  The Second Circuit confronted this ambiguity
in Faulkner.
THE FAULKNER OPINION
<7> Douglas Faulkner and his co-plaintiffs are freelance
photographers and authors whose photographs and articles
appeared in print issues of National Geographic Magazine.17
National Geographic subsequently compiled the Magazine issues
into a CD-ROM archive (the Complete National Geographic or
“CNG”).18  The plaintiffs argued that the digital archive violated
their copyrights in the original works by exceeding the scope of
the original licenses granted to National Geographic.19
<8> The Second Circuit held that the digital archive maintained
3
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the original context of the print articles and thus constituted a
privileged revision under § 201(c).20  The court noted that the
digital archive used the “almost identical ‘selection, coordination,
and arrangement’ of the underlying works as used in the
original collective works.”21  The digital archive contained
electronic replicas of the Magazine pages presented two at a
time with the fold in the middle and the page numbers in the
lower outside corners—just like the print editions.22  Moreover,
the articles and pictures were located in the same relative
positions that they were in the print editions.23  Users of the
digital archive had the same ability to focus on particular pages
or portions of pages as they would with a copy of the print
edition.24  The court stated that “because the original context of
the Magazines is omnipresent in the CNG and because it is a
new version of the Magazine, the CNG is a privileged revision of
a collective work.”25
<9> The court’s decision in Faulkner is noteworthy because it
allows for the addition of new, independently-copyrightable
material to a work without destroying that work’s revision
status. The digital replica portion, by itself, would be analogous
to a microfilm copy of the Magazine. Microfilm reproduction has
long been protected.26  Under Faulkner, publishers have the
ability to add features like an introductory animation sequence—
making creative changes to independent submissions and taking
them out of the original print context—and still have a protected
revision.27
THE EFFECT OF FAULKNER
<10> The ruling in Faulkner arguably runs counter to Congress’
intent in enacting the 1976 revision of the Act. The shift from
pre-1976 copyright law to the present Act is simple: The Act
allows the freelancer to benefit from demand for his or her
freelance article standing alone or in a new collection after
having authorized initial publication.28  Response among
interested groups has varied as to whether the Second Circuit’s
interpretation of § 201(c) in Faulkner is in accord with the Act’s
purpose.
<11> Some freelance writers and photographers criticized the
court’s broad reading of what constitutes a § 201(c) revision
because it limited the benefit conferred by Congress.29
Freelancers want the ability “to participate in new markets for
the reuse of their previously published works in new media to
secure new sources of income.”30  The freelancers argue that if
the print publishers have the right to make digital reproductions 4
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under § 201(c), the digital market will not be lucrative for
original authors.
<12> Print publishers often express a different perspective on
the Faulkner court’s decision. The American Library Association
argued that the “public’s right to a free and open information
society” trumps the rights of original freelance authors and that
original authors are free to contract for the exclusive right of
republication.31  The publishers believe that the Faulkner court
properly ignored the fact that the revision was created in a
different medium than the original print magazines.
IS FAULKNER CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER CASES?
<13> The Second Circuit’s holding in Faulkner was the third key
case to interpret § 201(c) and must be viewed in light of two
previous cases. The first was Greenberg v. National Geographic
Society, a case filed by a freelance photographer against
National Geographic in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida at the same time that the Faulkner
plaintiffs brought suit in the Southern District of New York.32
Plaintiff Greenberg had contributed several photographs for
publication in National Geographic issues.33  National Geographic
reproduced these photographs in the CNG (the CNG also
included one of Greenberg’s photographs in the opening
animation sequence of the CD-ROM).34  Greenberg subsequently
filed an infringement action against National Geographic. The
district court granted National Geographic’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the grounds that the CNG was a privileged revision
under § 201(c).35  The plaintiff appealed the district court’s
ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.36
<14> The Eleventh Circuit broke down the CNG into three
discrete components: (1) the opening animation sequence, (2) a
digital replica of the print edition issues, and (3) a search
feature that allows users to search for and retrieve images in
the digital archive.37  Next, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the
animation sequence and search-feature were independently
copyrightable additions to the digital replica of Magazine
issues.38  The court held that even if § 201(c)’s revision
privilege could be extended to the digital replica, the court
would be “unable to stretch the phrase ‘that particular collective
work’ to encompass the [opening animation] Sequence and
Program [search feature] elements as well.”39  The court
concluded that the entire CNG was not a revision of the original
print issues, but rather a new product that transcended the 5
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scope of § 201(c)’s revision privilege.40  Thus, under facts
virtually identical to those in Faulkner, the Eleventh Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion regarding whether § 201(c)
protected the CNG—primarily because the U.S. Supreme Court
had not yet laid down its original context rule.
<15> A few months after the Eleventh Circuit decided Greenberg,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case that clarified the
meaning of a “revision” under § 201(c) and set out a simple
rule for courts to follow. In New York Times Co. v. Tasini, six
freelance authors sued print publishers (i.e., The New York
Times, Sports Illustrated, and Newsday) to whom they had
submitted work for copyright infringement.41  Some time after
the original print publications, the publishers allowed
LEXIS/NEXIS, the owner and operator of an Internet database,
to copy the freelance works.42  At the time of the original
submissions, the publishers had agreements with LEXIS
licensing the text of articles appearing in the periodicals for copy
and sale.43  As with the CNG, the print publishers were
electronically reproducing freelance submissions to their
publications. The freelancers alleged that the database
reproductions of their original submissions exceeded the scope
of their contracts with the print publications.44  The print
publishers contended that, as copyright owners of the collective
works (i.e., the original print publications), they had validly
exercised their privilege under § 201(c) to reproduce and
distribute revisions of the collective whole to which the
freelancers had originally submitted their work.45
<16> In affirming the Second Circuit’s finding below that §
201(c) did not protect the copying at issue, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced a new rule. In order to be a privileged revision
under § 201(c), the new collective work must maintain the
“original context” of the original publication.46  LEXIS’ databases
reproduced and distributed articles standing alone and not in
context as part of the collective work to which the author
contributed or as part of a revision of that collective work.47
<17> The U.S. Supreme Court had little difficulty distinguishing
between the appearance of the print source and the
databases.48  The Court pointed out that each database article
appeared as a “separate, isolated ‘story’” without any visible link
to the other stories originally published in the same newspaper
or magazine.49  The LEXIS reproduction also lost formatting
features such as page placement and headline size.50  In short,
the LEXIS databases presented articles to users “clear of the
context provided either by the original periodical editions or by
51 6
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any revision of those editions” as required by § 201(c).
<18> Since the rulings in Tasini and Faulkner, legal
commentators have argued that Greenberg is old law. One
commentator asserts, for example, that the Greenberg analysis
“is hard to reconcile” with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Tasini.52  The reason is that the Eleventh Circuit in Greenberg
arguably placed undue emphasis on the presence of additional
features in the CNG that were added to the digital archive of
Magazine issues.53  When extended, this logic would find that
the addition of an index to a print archive would prevent a work
from being a privileged revision of the original.54  The search
feature of the CNG could be viewed simply as an electronic
analog of a print volume’s index; such an addition would not
make a lay observer think that an entirely new work has been
created.55
<19> Despite scholarly criticism, Greenberg has not been
formally rejected by a federal appellate court. However, as the
court in Faulkner observed, the “Tasini approach . . . so
substantially departs from the Greenberg analysis that [Tasini]
represents an intervening change in law . . . .”56  Moreover, the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant petitions for certiorari in
both Greenberg and Faulkner.57  The Supreme Court has stated
that denial of certiorari “imports no expression of opinion upon
the merits” of any given case.58  However, it is plausible that
the Court believes that Faulkner was correctly decided in light of
the Court’s interpretation of § 201(c) in Tasini and, thus, no
true split exists among the Circuits.59
<20> The Faulkner court clearly rejected the approach used in
Greenberg and applied the new “original context” rule of
Tasini.60  The court held that “because the original context of
the [National Geographic] Magazines is omnipresent in the CNG
and because it is a new version of the Magazine, the CNG is a
privileged revision.”61  Whereas the LEXIS databases in Tasini
did not allow readers to view the underlying works in their
original context, the CNG maintained the same page ordering,
page placement, and gutter position (i.e., the magazine fold) as
the print edition.62  Moreover, an authorized revision may
contain elements not present in the original—“for example, a
collection of bound volumes of past issues with a copyrightable
index to the entire collection.”63  Under the original context rule,
changes to the original Magazine issues did not remove the CNG
from the scope of § 201(c)’s revision privilege—unlike the
changes made in Greenberg.
<21> It is significant to note that the Greenberg plaintiff had 7
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contributed photographs, not articles, to National Geographic
Magazine.64  Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit focused on how
his photographs were used in an independently-copyrightable
animation sequence in the CNG.65  Had Greenberg been a print
contributor, his case may have been less compelling because
articles appeared in the CNG without alteration from the print
issues. Under such circumstances, the court might have
analogized the search feature to a print index and held the CNG
to be a privileged revision. The Faulkner decision would then be
more of an evolution of Greenberg rather than a divergence
from it and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision might have greater
persuasive authority.
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION SPECTRUM
<22> Faulkner and Tasini give lawyers a framework upon which
to analyze whether a particular alteration of a collective work
constitutes a privileged revision under § 201(c). These cases
offer a set of rules that a court can apply to a spectrum of
factual instances wherein contributing authors and publishers of
collective works have not negotiated what specific reproductions
will be permitted in the future. The spectrum may also be
instructive for compilers and contributors as they negotiate
licensing terms.
<23> Identical copies of the collective works are at one end of
the spectrum, clearly protected by the Copyright Act. Archives
of collective works may also be copied into a different
medium.66  An electronic copy such as the one in Tasini is at the
opposite end of the spectrum. Under Tasini, a searchable
database that compiles individual articles in no particular order
will not be protected from infringement suits, absent explicit
authorization in the copyright license. National Geographic’s CNG
occupies a place in the continuum between the identical copy
and the randomly-ordered, searchable database.
<24> The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Faulkner suggests that
the CNG, with its various alterations from the original print
editions, is analogous to an archive of a collective work that is
copied into a different medium.67  The collective work compiler
may add independently copyrightable features to a collective
work revision without moving it to a point on the spectrum that
falls outside of § 201(c). For example, a 1990 revision of a
1980 encyclopedia can still be a protected revision when it
includes independently copyrightable articles, photographs, or
drawings related to events that occurred since publication of the
1980 revision. Current precedent provides a framework of
default rules for contracting parties to examine in determining 8
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compensation for licensing rights.
CONCLUSION
<25> The Faulkner decision is a significant development in the
law of copyright because it allows a great deal of flexibility for
collective work authors to electronically reproduce works that
are created by freelancers. The decision seems to override the
intent of Congress in passing the 1976 Copyright Act to protect
freelance contributors.68  The plaintiffs in Faulkner argue that
the Second Circuit’s decision will prevent freelance authors from
realizing maximum profits from their original works. But neither
compilers nor contributing authors know what the full extent of
the Faulkner decision will be. Accordingly, authors of
contributions and collective works must analyze their work in
light of the reasoning of Faulkner and Tasini to identify and
preempt potential issues that may arise in the context of
electronic reproduction. Given the uncertainty that is created by
constant changes in electronic reproduction technology, the
wisest course for compilers and contributing authors is to
negotiate electronic reproduction issues in thorough detail before
signing a licensing agreement.
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201(c) in Greenberg.
60. Faulkner, 409 F.3d at 37-38.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Greenberg v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 244 F.3d 1267,
1269 (11th Cir. 2001).
65. Id. at 1273.
66. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in dicta that
microfilm and microfiche perceptibly reproduce
articles as part of the collective work to which the
author contributed or as part of any “revision”
thereof. See New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, 533
U.S. 483, 501-02 (2001).
67. See Faulkner v. Nat’l Geographic Enters. Inc., 409
F.3d 26, 38 (2d Cir. 2005).
68. Although, the Second Circuit was constrained by
binding precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreting § 201(c) in Tasini, 533 U.S. 483.
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